In June, controllers ordered the pilots of a 737 to make a rapid descent from 24,000 feet, while the plane was 50 miles from Palm Beach International Airport. The flight was then instructed to make a night landing on a 6,900-foot runway, which the captain thought was too short.
Then I would say the captain needs to work on his short field landings. Seriously, 6,900’ in a 737? I know it was night, no ILS, with the new guy but come on…it’s not a freakin jumbo.
Umm, Midway’s runways are that length with a lot of 737 operations. Our airport sees occasional 737 operations on a 6500 foot runway, day and night. I don’t see the problem there.
Hawaiian and Aloha use to operate DC-9’s and 737’s to Molokai Airport in Hawaii. It’s runway is 4500 feet. Granted, the longest flight to the airport was less than 100 miles.
I got a Better Idea- if you don’t like the clearance DON’T EXCEPT IT! A simple unable will do…You’re the captain of 737 ACT LIKE IT
Yours works too. 8) 
“In another instance, in February 2008, the pilots of a Boeing 737 airliner were instructed to take off at an intersection rather than use the full 9,000-foot runway at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. However, the pilots had loaded the jetliner with fuel and needed an additional quarter-mile of runway to ensure safety. The plane took off overweight.”
What a stupid, unresearched, moronic thing to write.
- If the pilot wants to backtrack/backtaxi, he’ll tell you.
- The pilots weren’t “instructed” to take off… they were cleared.
- How much more fuel would they have burnt off with a full length departure?
When page 2 of a pathetic 5 page “report” contains stupidities like this, you know you have a well researched article .
This article appears to be using the NASA ASRS database as the basis for this article.
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/report/electronic.html
Callback is always good reading.
Of course, without the specific references to the exact ASRS reports, it is kinda hard to figure some of these issues out.
So, these “instances” were of operators, who for whatever reason, realized they had made a bad decision or something happened that they didn’t like after the fact, and decided to self-report it.
So, the “stupid, unresearched, moronic” things written here:
Were written by the pilots.
Things happen. ASRS reports exist for these issues to come to light.
Go to the ASR link and read through the Callback articles. Very educational.
Edit: I’m not saying pilots are “stupid, unresearched, or moronic.”
I took my own advice and looked up the PBI story in the ASRS database:
The real story has nothing to do with the pilot unable to land on a 6900 foot runway…it was the bad situation he was put in.
ASRS #839438
This is a routine problem when coming south into Florida. We were at FL240 about 50 miles north of PBI, expecting the ILS Runway 9L, which is what was on the ATIS (it did change to visual 13 during our descent). We requested lower and were told to standby. The First Officer had about 100 hours in type, and was flying well and planned ahead. MIA Center then gave us direct to a fix we could not locate. When we asked they said it was on the Runway 13 final approach. They gave us a crossing restriction 35 north at 10,000 FT. I told the First Office to start down while I looked for it. I couldn’t find the fix and the Controller told us it was on the GPS 13 final. We are not GPS equipped which he would have known if he had looked at our designation. We were handed off to approach and given a clearance to (I believe) 3000 FT. We were now very high and fast because they started us down so late (250 KTS, slats and Flaps 11) and we saw the runway at 10 o’clock and advised. We re-briefed the usual with a VOR backup. We were given 1500 FT and turned on to the airport, it was obvious that we couldn’t get down and I told approach we needed a right 270 degree turn (to lose altitude and speed), they said unable and go use vectors back to the north. They seemed very annoyed so I told them they can’t start us down so late and give us a runway clearance at the last minute and expect us to get down. Runway 13 is only 6900 FT long and the last thing I wanted was to be high and fast to a short runway with no ILS at night with a new guy flying. I had a lot of time in type and I don’t think I could have made it work, certainly a new pilot couldn’t. This was unsafe controlling as far as I’m concerned, and it was a setup for a runway over-run. I feel we did well but the Controller could do better.
Synopsis
Air carrier inbound to PBI described late descent event, alleging ATC is frequently late in issuing descent clearances making stabilized approach procedures very difficult.
Ok, and here is the report from the intersection departure people:
WE WERE #2 FOR DEPARTURE ON RWY 27R AT FLL. WE JUST RECEIVED OUR WT AND BAL. WE PROCEEDED TO APCH END OF RWY 27R. AS WE APPROACHED, THE CONTROLLER ASKED US, ‘DID YOU GET BROWARD COUNTY PERMISSION TO OPERATE FROM FULL LENGTH?’ WELL, THIS COMMENT TOOK US COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE AND CLOUDED MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. HE THEN TURNED US OVER TO GROUND CONTROLLER AND SHE STARTED TO GIVE US CONTACT INFORMATION FOR THE BROWARD COUNTY. WELL, AT THIS POINT THE FO AND I ARE FAR INTO THE ‘YELLOW.’ WE HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED RECEIVING WT AND BAL FOR A PORTION OF THE RUNWAY THAT WAS RESTRICTED. APPARENTLY, DEPARTURES ARE ONLY PERMITTED FROM TXWY B5. WE FELT THAT PERHAPS, THE WT AND BAL WAS, IN FACT, BASED ON DEPARTURE FROM TXWY B5. WE FELT PRESSURED AND DECIDED THAT DEPARTURE FROM TXWY B5 WAS ACCEPTABLE (7700 FT REMAINING). WE DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HOWEVER, ONCE AIRBORNE, WE TOOK A CLOSER LOOK AT THE WT AND BAL AND DETERMINED WE WERE OVERWT FOR A TXWY B5 INTERSECTION DEPARTURE. CALLED DISPATCH ON THE PHONE UPON OUR ARRIVAL IN ZZZ. I BRIEFED THE DISPATCHER ON THE EVENT AND ADMITTED WE TOOK OFF FROM INTERSECTION TXWY B5 IN AN OVERWEIGHT CONDITION. DEPARTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FROM FULL LENGTH. HE ADVISED ME THE NEXT FLIGHT FROM FLL EXPERIENCED THE SAME ISSUE BUT TOOK A DELAY TO GET PERMISSION, FROM BROWARD COUNTY, FOR A FULL LENGTH DEPARTURE. HE ALSO ADVISED ME A NOTAM WAS ISSUED ON THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT ONLY THE TOWER NEEDED TO BE ADVISED FOR A FULL LENGTH DEPARTURE. THIS NOTAM WAS NOT PRESENT IN OUR PAPERWORK. CRM, ERROR MANAGEMENT. IF WE HAD TAKEN MORE TIME, AND IGNORED OUR EXTERNAL PRESSURES, WE WOULD HAVE DEPARTED FROM FULL LENGTH. THIS WAS A ‘TEXT BOOK’ ERROR MANAGEMENT EVENT. I’M STILL KICKING MYSELF FOR RUSHING AND SUCCUMBING TO EXTERNAL PRESSURES (ATC, MULTIPLE AIRCRAFT WAITING FOR TAKEOFF). IN OUR DEFENSE, WE HAD MULTIPLE EVENTS, UNFAMILIAR TO US, TAKE PLACE IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. 1) WT AND BAL DATA FOR A RESTRICTED RUNWAY. 2) AN ATC TRANSMISSION THAT I FEEL WAS MORE A ‘STATEMENT’ (HEY KNUCKLEHEAD, WHERE ARE YOU GOING) THAN THAT OF A CLEARANCE.
Synopsis
B737-400 FLT CREW, UNAWARE OF NOTAM CONCERNING PARTIAL RWY AVAILABLE, DEPARTED FROM INTERSECTION IN OVERWEIGHT CONDITION.