Emivest (Sino Searingen) SJ30-2


Since filing for Chapter 11 in October of 2010 I have yet to read any stories on this failed aircraft. With reported bookings between 200 and 300 units it’s hard to believe that funding was not able to be had and Emivest cease operations.
Does anyone have any up-to-date information regarding the status of this aircraft in or out of bankruptcy court?


tinyurl.com/48cnuf4 previous Flightaware topic regarding the SJ-30,

N30SJ, demo, was out flying this weekend flightaware.com/live/flight/N30SJ

I haven’t heard anything new, can’t find anything on the net either.


You can still see the four SJ30s flying. Watch for N200DV, N30SJ (demo), N30GZ, and N7SJ (blocked). N7SJ is operating in S Africa. The rest are based in the US.

Emivest has received bids for the company and that process will conclude in the next 10-15 days. Unfortunately, the company has not been able to release any information. It continues to operate in Chapter 11 albeit with a reduced staff. The staff are dedicated to providing outstanding customer service,AOG support, spares, etc for the flying aircraft. There are three SJ30s in work in San Antonio that will be delivered within approx 12-18 months from when the company emerges from bankruptcy.

The SJ30 has been known as the SA30, the Gulfjet (funded by Gulfstream) the SJ30-2, the SJ30 (under Sino Swearingen and then Emivest). I count six lives so far - so we have three more. The aircraft is too good to go away.

M 0.83 (494 ktas) from FL31-FL30, M 0.80 at FL450, M 0.76 LRC at 630 pphs total, a range of 2500 nm with 3 people at LRC, and the sea level cabin.

Look for the SJ30 to come back and come back with a vengence. Stay tuned.


I noticed N200DV (best paint job ever) in town the other day, and I also wondered what was going on with the type.


thenational.ae/business/avia … -more-time

Court documents reveal the list of possible buyers includes China Aviation Industry General Aircraft (CAIGA).

The state-backed company has a reported US$1.5 billion (Dh5.5bn) in assets which it has used to carry out an aggressive investment strategy in the US, including the acquisition of Epic Aircraft of Oregon last year, and a campaign to buy the general aviation engine maker Teledyne Continental Motors of Alabama. Emivest’s potential asset sale to CAIGA is supported by Gregg Williams, the president and chief executive of Williams International, an Emivest creditor.

In a letter to the court, Mr Williams said the Chinese company planned to invest “more than $100 million” to restart the stalled production of the SJ30


mysanantonio.com/default/art … 327804.php

A U.S. bankruptcy judge in Delaware on Thursday approved the sale of San Antonio-based Emivest Aerospace Corp. to a Utah company, MT LLC, for $3.5 million in cash and other financial considerations.



Not sure if this is good news or really bad news??

First if it sold for 3.5 million - what must China have been offering? or did they lose interest when they recently bought Cirrus???

Second - there is no mention the buyers plan to build airplanes - the LLC is owned by Metalcraft Tech who manufactured the tail section of the SJ-30.

So, are they planning to break up the company, keep what they want - and sell off the rest of the assets - or build planes???


With reported bookings between 200 and 300 units it’s hard to believe that funding was not able to be had and Emivest cease operations.

The above orders were to themselves - a Emivest investor, had planned to resell the airplanes worldwide - and it was his company that placed the order.

There was never 200 orders for potential operators of the aircraft.

This deal doesn’t sound right - the original owners and subsequent investors spent over 700 million dollars to develop the jet - for the assets to sell for 3.5 million - sounds like a fire sale of assets.

This does not look good for the future of the SJ-30 if there is one???


The company’s “assets” were sold in court on Thursday. Metalcraft Technologies who build the aft fuselage and approx 70% of the sheet metal parts for the SJ30 as well as assemblies for other major aerospace companies now owns those assets. They plan to build the SJ30 in the future and are well experienced to do so as they have been team member since 1995.

This asset purchase is a great thing for the SJ30 as it finally allows the program to move forward without all of the baggage from the former Taiwanese owners, the UAE owners, and the debt incurred during the last 15 years. As the company moves forward it will be leaner and be more readily set up to succeed. Look for additional information in the coming weeks. Fly Safe, but Fly Fast.

Remember the SJ30 still flies 2500 nm, has an Mmo of M 0.83 which is attainable thru approx FL390 and a cruise Mach in excess of 0.80 at and above FL450, and has a sea level cabin thru 41,000 ft. Just watch the SJ30s on flightaware to see the impressive performance.


‘Mark Fairchild, an Emivest vice president, said employees were advised of the sale Thursday. Fairchild said he understands that MT plans to maintain Emivest as a jet manufacturer. He did not know any details.’

Sale is approved to MT LLC, a group of investors led by CEO David Grant of Metal Technologies of Cedar Rapids, Iowa.

Here is a copy of the actual court filing from October/2010 that states they have 3 aircraft in ‘various’ stages of pre-producton.

download.aopa.org/epilot/2010/10 … ration.pdf

As yet the new owners have not released any information or statements of any kind???, nor have responded to any press inquiries.


There will be an announcement next week. During the transition from Emivest to MTI there has been discussion with the press, but it has been not officially been released as of yet. The SJ30 program will continue forward.


Look forward to more news.

Hookster - I see you have a pm sent to you on pprune!! Just in case you haven’t seen it!!

Looking forward to seeing the next three SJ’s off the line.

So, now we need a new name for the plane again!!

The MT SJ-30-2 ??? Hope they give the jet an quality name . . .


aopa.org/aircraft/articles/2 … _utah.html


Are N404SJ and N50SJ still airworthy???

Will they be traveling to Utah???

Curious why Emivest skipped completing aircraft 009 - and choose
to complete and deliver 010 N30GZ.

Is 009 the reason the extra 1.7 million in the purchase price of
the sale???


This is one of those threads that I missed early on.

The SJ30-2, is what got me hooked on the idea of owning and operating a VLJ. Since that time, a flurry of other VLJ concepts hit the market. The Adam 700, Eclipse 500, Javelin Jet, etc. It has been said that they all had some kind of money problem. But - was it really a money problem, or something else that killed those projects, or at least severely wounded them?

For the past seven (7) years, I’ve been doing homework on what it would take to bring a new aircraft concept to market. I went from wanting to own a high performance single, to wanting to own a high performance twin jet, to wanting to build a new Aircraft Company and produce new aircraft concepts that the industry would appreciate and enjoy. As I began to do my homework, I became very disturbed at what I was learning about our nation’s airplane business - more importantly, our nation’s regulatory regime that makes our airplane business so difficult to operate.

I’ll state it here, and I’ll probably state it again before I’m done, that I do not believe in skirting safety issues in any area of aviation, let alone the new aircraft design, development, testing and evaluation process. But, I also do not believe that we should allow paranoia to govern better judgment and/or override common sense. Yet, our nation’s new aircraft certification process, in many respects, seems to do exactly that and more.

Based on what I have learned, I feel very confident in my conclusion that Part 23 and the unwillingness to revisit its archaic tenets and not necessarily the “failure of management” (although that is another topic altogether) is the Number #1 killer of new General Aviation aircraft concepts in the United States. So, much so, that the opening paragraph in Part 23 should contain a Surgeon General’s Warning, that attempting to develop a new GA aircraft concept, could lead to financial death.

During my research, I had on several occasions, conversations with people from all over the aviation/aerospace industry. I was serious about building a new Aircraft Company and I wanted to learn about the industry and why it functioned the way it did. I started with the aircraft itself and thus, I spoke with aerospace science engineering professionals with extensive backgrounds that ranged from tenured university professors of Aerospace Science, to former professionals in aerospace and aeronautics who worked in companies like Boeing. I’ve spoken (extensively) with a former senior Boeing aeronautical engineer, who also worked on the first F22 Raptor prototype team. I’ve had conversations (more like interviews) with people at Transport Canada, in their National Aircraft Certification division.

I’ve had conversations with two, fairly well known bespoke aircraft designers and a published aerodynamicist who contributed to some portions of the NASA test flight program. I’ve had communications with organizations whose sole reason for existing was to get new aircraft concepts through the FAA certification process for companies wanting to bring such projects into existence. To be as thorough as possible, I’ve even visited a very well known experimental aircraft kit company and had also discussions with its long time rival (another kit company) on the subject of getting new airframes to market in the experimental category, just to understand the distinction between the two processes.

I was as thorough as I could be in my research and I examined (as much as could be examined from the outside looking in) all of the failures in General Aviation over the past 15 -20 years, as well as several of the success stories - those who made it through. What I found were success stories in the certified category, as well as in the experimental category, but the failure rates were off the charts.

In each failure scenario, there were a number of things that went wrong - many of those things were as different as the companies involved. However, the three (3) main threads that the seemed to perpetually haunt each company or each new aircraft concept failure were the following:

a) A lack of capital resources.
b) A lack of understanding about how much capital would be needed.
c) An overly cumbersome FAA Part 23 process.

Almost invariably (I would say, without question) When you blend these three (3) ingredients together, you have the recipe for systemic program failure, at some point along the lifespan of any new aircraft concept born here in the United States of America. One cannot help but wonder:

How many potential jobs have been lost become of this?
How many wonderful aircraft concepts never see the light of day in full production because of this?
How has innovation in general aviation suffered as a direct result of this?

Certifying a new General Aviation concept, should not cost a billion dollars. Let’s just stipulate that right up front. If we are going to continue to proceed under the notion that somehow real innovation will occur in GA, at $1bln per certified copy, then we are doing nothing more than kidding ourselves, because only the billion dollar companies can justify the cost of innovation, if that is the price tag. If we want things to change in our industry and if we truly want the opportunity to fly more innovative creations, then we have to be willing find compromises along the certification path under Part 23. There is just no other way to get to “there,” from “here.”

The FAA is stuck in the 20th century regulatory past and in many ways is unwilling to step into the 21st century. Much of Part 23 is over-blown, over-reactive, over-reaching and often times disconnected from reality. In order to fully appreciate this, one has to study Part 23 and then apply it to new aircraft concept certification scenarios. Such regulatory recalcitrance stifles innovation and hurts GA in the long run. Even when the “new” aircraft concept does not braking 100% new technical ground, Part 23 is so inflexible, so rigid, so incredibly antiquated and so blinded to such realities that it cannot see the unnecessary redundancies built into its code. This failure of vision on the part of Part 23, is what drives the technical requirements that ultimate bankrupt a new aircraft start-up venture, long before it can get the aircraft into full production. This rigidity must change, if GA is to truly thrive.

I understand the concept of safety in aviation and as I stated above, I am 100% on the side of the FAA when it comes to this measure. However, old and outdated modes of operation and testing/evaluation procedures that drive up the certification costs and thus the development costs, are what single handily kills new innovative ideas from ever reaching the public by way of new aircraft design offerings. The certification costs are wrapped up in proofing and documentation. The testing of aircraft systems, components and sub-systems, which yields the proofing, is so thick with unnecessary redundancies and technical requirements in most cases, that the idea of common sense analysis & verification seems to be left on the side of the road with its thumb in the air waiting for a ride home.

Here’s a tiny example: If a “new aircraft design concept” intends on using components and fitments that have already been certified under a different project - then those already existing certified components should be Grandfathered and/or programmatically Adopted into the design, and only the changes, or deltas from the Grandfathered/Adopted components should be subjected to new certification proofing and new documentation. I obviously don’t have the time or the space to outline all of the illogical stanzas of Part 23 here, as it might apply to a new GA concept, for example - but rest assured, the certification process is massively overweight and far too cumbersome for most anyone contemplating a new aircraft design these days, unless one has nearly a billion dollars to spend on development and certification costs alone.

I learned along the way that not only do aircraft manufacturers have run the Part 23 certification gauntlet, but the OEM suppliers of components that go into the new aircraft design, have to pass mustard under Part 23 as well. If that OEM is producing a component that is “critical to flight” - or - that involves “safety of flight,” then that manufacturers process has to be up to Part 23 standards as well, or the aircraft manufacturer has to demonstrate how its internal manufacturing process will ramp-up the 3rd party component(s) to Far Part 23 standards. Assembly lines have to be certified, manufacturing processes have to be certified, automated process must be certified, initial molds and tooling has to be certified - the entire process is intense and highly scrutinized - and as well, it should be.

I’m not Anti-Certification Scrutiny. I want to make that abundantly clear. But, I am Anti-Sub Optimal Process. I am against failure to optimize government processes that end up costing the manufacturer a billion dollars, which ultimately gets passed along to the flying public - whether as passenger, pilot or owner/operator in the long run. I’m saying that those areas of Part 23 that can be altered, edited and completely removed, should be for the sake of clarity and the optimization of certification/development costs - which are two new aircraft cost drivers that are inextricably tied to the hip.

What small to medium size new aircraft start-up can justify that kind of expenditure in an industry where the end-user wants more for less? How many new aircraft would a new start-up have to sell right off the bat, just to cover development and certification costs, never mind the need to capitalize the start-up’s facilities costs, employee compensation, materials, tooling, equipment, lighting and advanced technologies costs. All of these costs, when layered on top of the nearly $1 Billion that it takes to “satisfy the FAA’s” failure to optimized its procedures, are what make even the idea of bringing a new aircraft to market, a cost prohibitive non-starter from the word GO. We have literally killed (murdering in cold blood) our General Aviation Industry like this, ever since the 1970’s (fraudulent lawsuits aside). When will this murderous rampage of innovation come to an end.

The very fact that we cannot fly the Javelin Jet today, is a fundamental crime and I for one am sick and tired of this crime being committed right before our very own eyes, every five (5) years or so. It seems as if every five (5) years or so, we hear about some good GA aircraft idea getting blown right out of the sky because of Part 23’s lack of optimization. Now, almost 17-20 years later the highest performing VLJ in the world, can’t even get into production, not because it was unable to get Part 23 certification - but most assuredly because the Part 23 certification process drained every last dollar out of the program over the years. So, it killed itself, just to get certified!

In Canada, the process is less costly, less time consuming and more streamlined (though, you can certainly argue still too costly). In places like Australia, China, Spain, Switzerland, and a host of other countries, the cost and time-lines for certification are considerably lower and they don’t have any higher an accident rate because they lack clearer, more obtuse certification guidelines in their new aircraft concepts brought to market. So, we can most certainly do much better here in the United States of America. The question is, do we have the will to do so. It makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, that the SJ30-2 is not in full production today, but you can bet your last dollar that the overly oppressive Part 23 regime had something to do with it.

For seven (7) years, I’ve wanted to establish a new Aircraft Company and bring a new line of General Aviation aircraft to market, but the certification costs make the proposition unfathomable at this point. Everything was already mapped out and everything has already been planned for such a new company, but the certification process was far too daunting. There is no business model that we can put together, that makes the business enterprise viable (from a financial/revenue standpoint) given the Part 23 costs involved - none whatsoever.

Again - how many jobs lost in America and how much has real innovation been hurt by Part 23? My company would have run with a minimum 350-500 employees. That’s 350-500 non-existent American Middle Class Jobs, all due to Part 23.

Yes, Cirrus did make it - but so many more failed. Now, Cirrus, is being lopped over to a company based in China. WHAT! What are we doing in this country! The Cirrus Jet (Personal Jet Program) was stalled because of a lack of “funding.” Government translation: A lack of Certification Funding. Take a look at Cessna, a very well established kingpin in General Aviation. Ask yourself: Why hasn’t a company like Cessna produced a new High Performance Single Engine concept in eons, favoring instead to acquire a kit plane from the older Lancair ‘experimental’ product line?

The so-called Cessna 400 Corvalis TTX airframe was eventually rolled over from the old Columbia project, which itself came directly out of the Lancair experimental ranks as the Lancair ES model. So, essentially, the Cessna 400 Corvalis TTX, is a certified and improved version of the Lancair ES experimental. The entire concept had its roots in the experimental category and was anything but new by the time Cessna saw it as a viable addition to its product line as a Part 23 certified airframe. My point here is that even a GA stalwart like Cessna, has an extremely difficult time getting a new aircraft design to market because of Part 23. Piper, seems to have had a little more success over the years in terms of being able to adapt parts from an older airframe to a newer airframe, but even they suffer from the same Part 23 illness. If Part 23 slams the door on innovation at Cessna and Piper, then what little start-up stands a snowballs chance of getting into the business legitimately in the face of Part 23’s failure to optimize?

Mooney - are you kidding me! When was the last time we heard of anything truly new and innovative coming out of that company. Look at the airframes of the Ovation3, Ovation2 and the Acclaim Type S. They are virtually the same, after all these years - no innovations in the design matrix to speak of, really. Very little forward progress has been made in the technological advancements in aerodynamics in any of their product line.

Piper - with its Matrix, Mirage and Meridian designs, has been the only GA aircraft company on the stalwart radar screen that has found a way to squeeze some innovation through to the public, in spite of Part 23. But, they had to do it by manipulating common parts (helping to reduce Part 23 costs) and slightly altering the mode-shapes of the aerodynamics of each of the three airframes, to give the “appearance” of newness and a full or broad product line. I’m not knocking what Piper has done, I’m simply calling a spade a spade. To bring about three (3) truly brand new aircraft concepts in the Matrix, Mirage and the Meridian, would have easily cost Piper more than $2 billion and they are a veteran aircraft builder. To accomplish the same with a new start-up, would easily run close to $3-$4 billion for three (3) completely new aircraft concepts (easy).

The bloodletting MUST stop. When will Part 23 change in this country, sufficient to revive what appears to be a slowly dying industry, or at least an industry that is clearly on life support?

Regarding Part 25, where there is a much higher risk to public safety involved and the companies driving those projects typically have the support of federal tax dollars and federal tax credits that help get their projects certified - those projects should retain reasonably higher levels of detailed certification procedure. But, Part 23 has plenty of room for streamlining, which would reduce the overall cost of certification and stimulate new (healthy) innovation.

I love (adore) the SJ30-2 and I truly hope to be able to put it solidly back on my contenders list for my new VLJ decision. But, the amount of money paid for the company to out of Chp. 11, is only a fraction of the total cost necessary to get the program fully up to speed and at this point, I have some serious reservations about any QC or QA process that governs the production standards off the line. This aircraft needs to get into production and a slightly larger airframe needs to replace the SJ30-2, as the SJ40 - hopefully. It does need a larger cabin, but I would not want to sacrifice the range, altitude, cruise speed or too much cabin pressurization - which are the three main factors that put the SJ30-2 into a class all by itself.

Just my 0.02 on this subject.


I appreciate that there are people like you out there; intelligent, well intentioned and I am guessing you are someone who could be described as a business progressive (to be taken in a good way). Don’t give up the good fight as they say but since you appear to currently be in the observational category of “peoples”, I worry that your words fall on ears and minds like mine. I am behind you all the way, but that and 25 cents in most cases won’t get you a cup of coffee. Here’s to SJ30’s rolling off the assembly line!


Now known as the SyberJet SJ-30 8)

mysanantonio.com/business/ar … 426133.php

“SyberJet has a solid operating plan to deliver new SJ30s to the world marketplace,” Mark Fairchild, the company’s San Antonio general manager, said in a prepared statement. “I look forward to providing more people the unique opportunity to experience the high-performance capability that the SJ30 affords its owners and operators.”


The SJ30 is a magnificent airplane, capable of flying further and faster than any other comparable light jet (please note, it fall squarely into the light jet category and is far to heavy to be considered a VLJ though it’s small cabin makes it seem like one).

However, as has been proven time and time again, engineering excellence does not equal market success. In the case of the SJ30, it has several weaknesses that hurt it in the market.

Cabin Size vs. Design Mission
For a 500 mile flight, an SJ30 doesn’t give you any real benefit over other less expensive Light and Very Light Jets (Phenom 100s/CJs, etc.) It starts to stand out on longer flights, especially 1500-2000+ miles. This makes it an exceptional plane for an experienced owner-pilot who desires a modern, economical transport that gets from NYC to Vegas faster than anything comparable. But for the corporate operator, charter company, and private owners that sit in back–between them the bulk of the market–the cabin is simply to small for trips this long. Obviously not every operator will balk, but it severely restricts the practicality of the aircraft for non owner-pilots.

Operating vs. Acquisition Costs
The SJ30 gives the owner a remarkable value in terms of hourly direct costs for the performance it offers. But as with any new airplane, acquisition costs are high. Thus, if an owner is willing to accept a used aircraft, they can often acquire a larger, faster, and/or more capable aircraft that may cost more on a per hour basis but has a lower total cost of ownership. For the SJ30-2s 7.5 million list price you can get a nice late model jet with comparable speed and range and a much bigger cabin for significantly less. Admittedly operating costs will be marginally higher, but that extra $2 million in your pocket will help offset that for many years.

Support Network
Other players in this market are able to leverage established global support networks to support light and very light jets. It remains to be seen how the SJ30 will be supported.

In short–the SJ30 faces a lot of challenges in the current market, and the high initial price combined with the small cabin and unknowns regarding long-term support make it attractive to a much smaller market than the specs otherwise suggest.


Great post Phenom300 and I happen to agree with you and dw747400. Just to throw it into production as is will only satisfy a very niche`market. Only with some R&D to increase the cabin size will the SyberJet (bad name) truly be a viable competitor. But to your well described point: Hypothetically, if the inside diameter of the cabin were expanded approx 6"-12" will certification costs prohibit it before leaving the drawing board?

At $3.5M I certainly wished I would have purchased a few more Powerball tickets as owning an aircraft that has certainly separated itself from the competition in terms of specs is something I would like to have owned. I wish Metalcraft the best and hope that management can get the SJ30 back into the air AND STAY THERE.

By the way, what % of fixed costs are Part 23 related?



The SJ30 is a niche player, but if you want a performance jet with range that never stops and a sea level cabin to 41,000 ft - it’s the jet. FL450 - M 0.80 burning 750 pph for 2,000 nm. Slow down to M .78 and its 650 pph and 2500 nm - Nothing like it.

SN 010 consistenly flies coast to coast as well as St. Johns to London non-stop.

I worked as VP of Sales and Test Pilot and now GM or SyberJet. It will go into production as it was meant and look out for more speed in the years to come.