Comair 191 Down!

Aviation Aviation News
61

blitzer,

In your rush to judge the situation and the pilots involved along with your your arrogance you’ve either ignored or missed a number of reported issues which may have caused confusion during the taxi such as first hand accounts of various people familiar with the airport on a blog at a local station (WKYT) in KY website:

“I have noticed that the runway number is painted on the 22 (newly repaved) and is not on the 26. This may of added to the confusion to the pilot knowing that there is construction and may have assumed that he was on the 22 runway.”

“I was actually flying at the Bluegrass Airport yesterday. To be fair, the normal taxiway (most-outer) to runway 22 was obstructed, and an alternate taxiway was in use. I do not know if this was the case as of this morning, but this could have easily contributed to confusion during take off. This information was clearly reported in the Airport information (ATIS)”

“…other questions to ask are what was the command given by the tower and their workload. if only one person was on duty they were responsible for clearance delivery, taxi, takeoff, and approach control. i have flown into and departed LEX at this hour of the morning and received a clearance that was basically taxi to runway 22 cleared for takeoff climb and maintain 3500 maintain rumway heading”

And these reports from reputable newspapers this morning:

Times (London, UK)
Investigations are focusing on whether controllers at Blue Grass airport directed the pilot to the wrong runway.

USA Today
Recent problems with runway lights at the airport could have caused confusion. The smaller runway is not supposed to be lit at night, according to an airport guide. Normally, the longer runway’s bright lights would make it easily distinguishable from the smaller runway.
However, most of the lights on the longer of the two runways had been inoperable until early Saturday and pilots had been notified of the outage, Federal Aviation Administration spokeswoman Laura Brown said. Brown declined to comment on the accident.
Capt. Terry McVenes, safety chief with the Air Line Pilots Association, said his union has long called for better signs and lights to help pilots avoid making wrong turns. “We think it’s very important,” said McVenes. “For $8 a gallon for paint, you can solve a lot of problems.”

New York Times
People involved in the investigation said the lights might have been illuminated on the shorter runway, which the plane would have approached first, even though an airport notice had told pilots that the lights were off
Such a discrepancy could have caused some confusion in the cockpit if the pilots were focused on looking for a lighted runway.
It had taken off in hazy weather only moments before, en route to Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta, on a flight that was scheduled for just over an hour, said Comairs president, Don Bornhorst.

So during the time of the crash all of the following are possible: hazing weather, it was still dark, they were not on the normal taxi runway due to constuctution, the normal bright lights of the major runway may not have been illuminated (or only partially so), the smaller runway may have had lights on though it shouldn’t have, the runway may not have been painted “26”, and you may have had to cross runway 26 to get to 22.

We will know more as the investigation proceeds but I just don’t think your perspective of simplifying the situation and making comments like “out with the ladies” and “dummies” are very constructive at a time like this: when 49 people lost their lives and the facts aren’t yet in.

By the way the pilot is a devoted father of two yound daughters and a dedicated, very smart, experienced, pilot.

PK

62

He got off the ground and into ground effect. The airplane was not ready to fly out of ground effect, and, so, it didn’t.

As I say, he could-a been empty and he never would have gotten out of ground effect off that runway. So, weight couldn’t be a factor in this wreck, mainly for the reason that the weight was within limits for that airplane at that pressure altitude and temp. He did everyhthing right, 'cept make sure he was on the assigned runway, which he didn’t and wasn’t. The only thing that contributed to this crash was incompetence because, had he been competent, all would have worked out and those people would be partying right about now.

He would not have been “forced” to use that runway cuz it is too short for that airplane, and, assuming he wasn’t even more incompetent, he would have waited for the longer runway to be available.

No one is “forced” into doing what he thinks will jeopardize safety. No one is required to accept any ol’ clearance.

63

blitzer if you’ll slow down just a bit you’ll see I didn’t say the pilot in this case was forced to do anything. I gave that as an example to understand and show if a pilot is pushed up against a short runway with the airplane he has at hand, it’s basic and fundamental he would rather have less weight. Maybe you’d rather load it to the hilt, I don’t know. But not me.

64

Well, he wasn’t smart enough to check his compass and check it with alignment of the runway, nor the taxiway. That’s all he had to do to unconfuse himself, IF he was confused. Plus, he had an airport diagram. Plus, he could have quizzed Ground.

In any case, ATIS had the conditions, and Clearance Delivery told him what to do, and Ground directed him, and, if Ground directed him in a way that didnd’t agree with previous instructions, he should have stopped and asked. Instead, he barreled ahead.

This has nothing to do with confusion. It has everything to do with faiure to see and avoid and to be situationally aware.

If “26” was not painted on the runway he ultimately took, why did he not question the controller? He ASSUMED, then, that it was the correct runway. Pilots ought never to assume.

Pilots taxi and fly airplanes in the dark. “Dark” does not cause accidents, and it didn’t cause this one.

If the runway lights were configured other than the expected way, it would have been in the local NOTAM and on ATIS.

Pilots don’t look for the “lighted” runway, rather the correct runway, and the only way to know that is to make the runway coincide with the compass and to eyeball the runway number, and, if there is no runway number, sheer sense should make the pilot question where he is.

In any case, if a pilot is that easily confused, he needs to be reevaluated, given all the signage and opportunities to become clear about what he is doing.

65

Amen and Amen petkea. Good thoughts and good post. After all, this is a human, hurting, feeling and most tragic tragedy with families left. It was a terrible accident as so many are. Mistakes? Probably, but not likely malice. More likely good folks trying to make a living for their folks and serve the public. So then the human thing again.

66

And I said that no pilot is forced to take a short runway when he has configured the airplane for a long runway. He doesn’t have the luxury of changing runways when he gets to the holding line and taking one that jeopardizes safety. If he can’t use the one that’s safe, he waits, just like at Big Bear, California, when it’s a hundred out.

This guy expected the long runway, and, not particularly choosy about his knowledge that morning, mosied out onto the runway his airplane couldn’t handle, and he didn’t even realize it until he ran off the other end. The airplane was configured fine. The pilot was not. He did not follow procedure.

67

And, how will that help NTSB figure out the cold, hard facts?

How will pilots try to learn from this accident by crying?

This forum is not for psychological release and mending. We’re discussing the, as I say, cold, hard facts of the case.

68

Well blitzer, you’ve missed my point every time now, but it’s alright, I’m done with it.

Perfection. How few of us have it. How nice it would be. No mistakes, no accidents.

Have a good day and God bless.

69

This is starting to resemble an airliners.net forum. Before all the armchair quarterbacks come to their own conclusions, let the NTSB do its job. It surely seems as though for some unknown reason, the pilots mistakenly used Rwy. 26 instead of 22, but none of us knows exactly why. As far as arguing over whether or not the weight is an issue, does it really matter in this instance? If they departed from the wrong runway, the mistake had already been made, and the weight wouldn’t be an issue at all. Blitzer, you can stick to the “cold, hard facts” to make your point, but these facts are going to have to be used to explain WHY this happened to 49 families. The psychological loss aspect DOES help prevent pilots from making such mistakes, as I hope many are shocked into realizing that they can’t afford to have a mental letdown at any time in the cockpit.

70

When pilots get into a jam, like the DC-10 at Souix City, they don’t sit there and cry, “Ohhh, the humanity!” The go to work trying to find the problem and to fix it. They can’t be saddled with emotions about it because that would hinder them.

Emotional outbursts now hinder investigation, even here.

It’s all fine and dandy that he was a father and he was a nice guy and he knew a lot. That doesn’t help now cuz, for some reason, none of that mattered when he failed to do his job.

Failing to have done his job could be the result of a lot of things, including what he did during his rest time. Maybe he didn’t get the rest that’s required and his eyes were fuzzy and he DID look at the compass and he thought it read “22,” not “26.” It’s obvious that the compass read “26” and that either he didn’t look at it, or he misread it. Either way is no excuse. He should have made sure for the simple reason: lives are at stake.

71

If there is somebody here stopping NTSB from doing its job, tell them that I told you to tell them to stop it!

The reason they used 26 and not 22 is clear: They thought they were on 22. That means they didn’t kinow they were on 26. There can be only one way for them not to know they were on 26: They didn’t check the compass during their line-up check. Had they done so, they would have seen, as in the '93 case, that they were on the wrong runway. It’s that simple.

Now, when the f/o can talk, he may say that they DID check the compass and that it read “22.” Now, what’s the chance of that?

Now, again about “confusion.” Both of them confused?? If they were confused, why not consult the charts, or ask? If they were confused and didn’t ask, that’s THEIR fault.

We know that the pilot had all the information necessary to find his way to the runway in use. We now know that, for whatever reason, he did not use all the info at his disposal to make the best decisions.

I wanna know what the PNF was doing during all this.

72

So, you were at the ramp and the controller told you to taxi and, at the very same time, cleared you for takeoff even though you were nowhere near the approach end of the runway and wouldn’t be there for a little while. He didn’t take into any account that, between the time you started taxi and the time you would get to the runway, other traffic could arrive. Is that what you want me to believe? Cuz I don’t.

Sorry, but it doesn’t work that way. You don’t get your takeoff clearance until you get to the runway and announce yourself, that you’re ready. He either tells you to hold short, or get into position, or clears you from there.

Most likely what the Clearance Delivery dude told you is the same thing Clearance Delivery everywhere tells pilots ringing them for a clearance:

“Taxi to 22; after takeoff, climb…”

The format is always the same. CRAFT. Clearance limit. Route. Altitude. Frequency. Transponder.

The Clearance Delivery bloke didn’t tell you to taxi, only where your taxi should take you. He is telling you how to go. Only Ground can give you the clearance to taxi. He tells you THAT you can go.

The controller assesses the situation when you arrive at the approach end of the runway, not before, because he knows it can change. Clearance Delivery doesn’t issue takeoff clearances. The Ground controller, who sometimes is also the local controller, stays the Ground controller until you reach the runway and tell him you’re ready.

And, by the way, no controller working in the cab does approach. All that is in the cab is Clearance Delivery [if any], Ground and the local controller. Approach Control – a room with guys sitting in front of scopes – may not even be at that airport.

73

To Boeing7475500: As you would understand, it is one thing to know you’re up against it as to the amount of runway you have for your plane and its load, and quite another if you think you have plenty of runway for it but don’t. In the former case a short field take-off procedure is in order and maybe you’ve a fighting chance anyway, in any case a better chance. In the latter maybe you don’t at least initially press and push as hard thinking it not necessary, so you have less chance of reaching the desired result.

74

First of all, let’s wait until the Voice Recorder info is known. However, I agree that there was obviously a step or two missed in the check.

Also, you can be cleared for takeoff while still taxiing. It has happened to me multiple times at RVS. Hearing something like " Malibu 84HL taxi to RW 19R, after run up is complete, cleared for takeoff RW 19L with no delay" is not uncommon. Granted, I also hear things like “Malibu 84HL cleared for takoff, RW 19L, cleared for the Braums 1 departure, maintain at or below 2500.” NOTE: There is no Braums 1 departure, it is something that my FIL and a couple of his buddies have created. There is also the Blue Bell 1 approach, Braums 1 approach, River Run approach, and the Turkey Shoot approach. Anyway, getting clearance before you get to the runway is not uncommon. I have also heard it at BFL, SNA, TVL, and MKC.

75

As many of you as there are out in flightware-land who might like to flame blitzer for his comments, he happens to be right about a few things:

And…

Right on. Pilots don’t take-off when they are confused; at least competent pilots don’t. Each member of the flight crew had charts, maps, ATIS, a tower controller, a compass, and each other as resources to use in order to avoid a dangerous situation… and attempting to take-off in a CRJ100ER using a 3,500’ runway is dangerous.

And it’s no less dangerous if the plane is EMPTY. Discussions about a/c weight with respect to THIS accident are pointless. That is the equivalent to witnessing a car crash and blaming the weight of the car as the cause of the crash.

76

Since the CVR details won’t come out for a little while, I guess we have to wait for the CVR in order to find out what’s on it. We hardly have a choice.

However, am I gonna wait for the CVR in order to discuss this?? Nope.

A mite critical since those steps could have saved lives.

Yes, at a piddly little bush-league stip in the middle of nowhere, where all they got is students comin’ in for cross-country witness signatures that they were there. But not at any airport during a rush. It could happen at 2 in the morning, even in Phoenix. But so what? You still don’t get a take off clearance while you’re still at the ramp, only as you near the runway.

77

abl703, in your analogy if the car not being able to stop caused the crash, and if the weight of the car prevented it from stopping in time then weight was indeed a factor in its crash. A bunch of ifs but that’s the deal. And a lighter airplane performs better than a heavier one at take-off. But this accident? You’re right, it’s an over and done deal. And as far as what the pilots did or did not know or what might have caused their (apparent) error, or even if they were indeed confused in their minds at the time is pure conjecture. Even those pretending to know don’t. And won’t.

78

Y’know, I be surprised that so many are willing to say, “Hey, they’re human and they were confused!” appearing to kind-a excuse their part in it all; “after all,” they say, “the airport is configured all wrong.” They don’t admit that the pilots were configured all wrong.

Now, if I were the chief pilot and one-a my pilots told me that he was confused, I’d hit the ceiling, and when I would come down, I’d be powerful inclined to aks myself, “What the Hell is a confused pilot doin’ in my stable, flyin’ my airplanes? I thought pilots were the epitome of not being confused. So, how did this one slip past me?”

Then, I’d have to take him off the line and retrain him, or, if I’m of a mind, terminate him. Ain’t ANY room for confusion on the flight deck. If you don’t know, aks!

79

Blitzer, you have GOT to stop replying to the pilot apologists on here or this thread will go on forever.

I particularly enjoyed the post quoting some of the press as some sort of “experts” in how confusion in the cockpit might have lead to this accident, especially confusion over the runway lighting.

There AIN’T no smeggin’ lights on 26!!! “RY 08/26 DAYTIME VMC USE ONLY”!

The cockpit crew screwed the pooch, plain and simple! Why they f*cked-up is conjecture at this point until the CVR transcript is released by the NTSB. The fact that the pilot might have been a loving husband, good father and rarely kicked his dog is irrelevant!

I can easily tell that the majority of the folks posting in this thread have never sat on an Accident Review Board. The FACTS of the matter are what determines what’s in the eventual report, not some touchy-feely nonsense about what nice guys the aircrew were.

For the ignorant few who insist on discussing weight, if the plane was light as a feather it would still have crashed if it required 5K feet to takeoff but only had 3.5K feet!

A wing in ground effect is NOT flying!

Sheesh!

80

“Blitzer-Air, state flight level!” :wink: