Because the days of the tower controller picking up a pair of binoculars to ensure compliance with radioed instructions are LONG gone!
Airline Pilot Warned Of Confusing Runway Layout
FlightAware has discovered that in 1993, the pilot of an air carrier filed a report with the NASA ASRS (aviation safety reporting system) after nearly departing from runway 26 when instructed to depart from runway 22 at Lexington.
The report reads, “Aircraft was cleared for immediate takeoff (traffic was inside the marker) on runway 22 at KLEX. We taxied onto the runway and told tower we needed a moment to check our departure routing with our weather radar (storms were in the area, raining at the airport). We realized our heading was not currect for our assigned runway and at that moment, tower called us to cancel the takeoff clearance because we were lined up on runway 26. We taxied clear and then held short of runway 22 for landing traffic. We took off on runway 22 and proceeded without incident. Possible contributing factors were poor visibbility and weather (rain. Confusing runway intersection and tower’s request for an immediate takeoff. Suggest possible warning page (similar to Houston Hobby) to clarify multiple runway ends.”
Directly off Flight Aware. Tower cancelled take off clearance because they were on the rong runway.
Yeah, in 1993!
The people in the tower are not babysitters.
91.3 says that the pilot in command is responsible for the safe opn of the flight.
The crew is supposed to be situationallly aware at ALL times.
It’s clear that the crew didn’t even check the compass when they lined up on the runway. Otherwise, they would have known how embarrased they should’ve been.
Typical runway lineup items include a compass check. The pilot not flying does this, and, had he noticed the compass read 260, sted 220, they could-a looked at each other, asked the tower for forgiveness and moved to the correct runway with only red faces to show for it.
They were lax in their procedures.
It’s not the weight. That airplane handles the weight.
It’s the length of the runway.
Had they been where they should have been, everybody would be fat and happy right about now.
They had the airport diagram, and, no doubt, they knew the airport, and, even if they didn’t, they could have and should have looked at the diagram, or, in the extreme throw-up-the-hands confused circumstance, asked the ground controller for a progressive.
Take it from me. People in the news bidness know nothing about the things about which they SHOULD know. At least something about aviation and law and medicine so they can aks intelligent questions.
Instead, you get the stuff you see and hear and read.
They really don’t know that “dark” does not cause wrecks, that the big boys fly in rain all the time.
They don’t know that twins fly safely on one engine, given, of course, pilot know-how.
However, airplanes don’t fly well when the dummies flying them are not meticulous about their work, as is apparent in this case.
As I say, had they checked the compass, we wouldn’t be writting about this now.
My guess is that they realized it at some point, rotated and flew into ground effect, flew out of ground effect where it didn’t have the speed to fly, and it settled to the ground, and that’s why you had it virtually in one piece. It stalled as they left ground effect.
They would-a been all right if they didn’t have to clear trees. Trying to clear the trees, they had to climb out of ground effect, and that’s where they stalled.
However, let’s see what ATIS at the time said about the departure runway, and let’s see what’s in their clearance from Clearance Delivery. There ought to be a tape of it, too.
If ATIS reported 22 to be the departure runway, and Clearance Delivery told them 22, and Ground told them to taxi to 22, and they thought that this airport is WWWAAAYYY too confusing, they should have asked for a progressive and followed along on their airport diagram. Then, they should have checked everything against the compass reading.
If ATIS reported 22 to be the departure runway and Ground told them to taxi to 26, the crew should have questioned the clearance because, after all, it didn’t square with their clearance. A crew doesn’t have to follow a clearance that is wrong, and they should question it when there are conflicts, or uncertainties.
So, when they got to 26, wrong, or not, they should have checked in with the local controller saying, “COMAIR 51-91 holding short-a 2-6. Ready for takeoff.” That’s when the local controller should have said, “HUH!?? What in tarnation y’alls doin’ ov-a thair? Yew need to be ov-a to yur left aways, at 2-2.”
Let’s say that they didn’t check in when they got to 2-6 and, as they approached, out of the blue, the local controller cleared them to take off on 2-6. Again, that doesn’t square with the clearance, nor with ATIS, and they should have held short until it was squared away.
As a next-to-final-check, they must have had their lights on, and the runway number, “26,” must have been right there in front of them. What was wrong with their eyesight?
This is why, when checking in with each controller, you tell the dude exactly where you are.
Yet, they still look around. They have-ta be situationally aware, too.
However, as I say, they are not babysitters. They are not responsible for flying YOUR airplane.
If the “co-pilot” was in the jumpseat, then he wasn’t the co-pilot; he may not log second in command time in that seat.
If a check pilot was in the right seat, he was acting as co-pilot. He logs “Pilot in Command” time, as does the dude in the left seat.
However, if the dude in the left seat is not flying, but the one in the right seat is, even though both may log PIC, the flying pilot is the actual PIC for command and responsibility purposes.
If the check pilot was in the jump seat, he could still log “Pilot in Command” time and, I believe, instructor time.
Just to be clear:
91.3 says the the pilot on command is the final authority as to the safe operation of the airplane. Nothin’ in there about any controller being also responsible. The controller is not part of my crew. I don’t hand over my responsibility to some $85,000-a-year, spike-haired doofus in a cab sippin’ coffee and enjoyin’ the scenery, nor to somebody hypnotized by a green scope. They advise me, and I tell them whether I’ll follow that advice, and, if I don’t follow it, I tell him to give me some other options.
So, it’s the responsibility of the PIC to be aware and to question unclear, inconsistent clearances since he is the final authority. Nobody has to accept a clearance; but, if they do, they must adhere to it unless in an emergency, or unsafe operations. The controller is not the boss. The PIC is.
Well, it may be clear that they got more than the required time called, “rest.” It may not be clear that the time was spent resting. Crews are required to rest during duty cycles, not just take the time.
So, if they partied with the ladies for the entire rest period plus, they didn’t rest and were not legally ready to fly even though the record shows that the rest period was more than required.
We’ll have to wait ‘n’ see what people say about the time between their most recent flight and this one, where they were and what they did.
Why do we need a bigger picture? This one pretty much gives everybody a good ide’er how the airplane looks, and, by now, everybody has seen them in real life. Besides, the news has splattered pictures of it all over the place.
From todays lexington Paper.
According to FlightAware, an aviation Web site, this is not the first time a pilot has gotten confused at Blue Grass Airport. In 1993, an airline pilot reported that he almost took off from Runway 26 but the tower caught the error and canceled the takeoff. In an entry on FlightAware’s Web site the pilot reported “poor visibility” and a “confusing runway intersection.”
1993, and the next one 2006. Thirteen years! Everybody else got around the place easily in all kinds of weather.
As I say, a pilot who doesn’t know what he’s doing there has two alternatives from which to choose:
- Ask Ground for a progressive
- Consult the airrport diagram
Not to mention runway number markings and other signs along the way.
No visibility is so poor that the pilot cannot see the runway number, or other signage nearby. If it is that poor, he has no business taxiing out. I’m not aware of any airports in the United States, nor 121s, nor 135s, certified for 0-0 takeoffs, although Part 91 can do what they want.
In any case, with a compass and directional gyro/heading indicator, how can a pilot who alleges to know what those things are not know whether he’s lined up on 22, or 26, fog and confusion nothwithstanding? Part of the taxi-out to an IFR flight is an instrument check along the way, and that includes checking the compass. It’s clear, then, from the heading indicator that, at LEX, if you are taxiing parallel to 22, you are headed 040, and, if you look, 26 goes one way and 22 goes another, according to the heading indicator. On a 040 heading along the taxiway, 26 is just a little beyong 90 degrees off your left, and 22 is a little more.
Just like planning for a hold; one course goes one way and the other goes another, and all of this info is on the heading indicator.
I know but with more weight more time it takes to get airborne.
Even with no passengers but with enough fuel to Atlanta plus IFR daytime reserve, they still wouldn’t have gotten off that runway. Weight didn’t contribute to the crash.
Every pilot who is spooked by having done something he suspects somebody may possibly perhaps could maybe report writes up a pre-excuse NASA form to cover himself. It’s a pre-confession to preclude somebody with a stray hair from getting in the first shot.
That guy lined up on the wrong runway and checked his compass, as he should have, and, to his amazement, he saw that the compass heading and the runway alignment didn’t square, and he taxied clear. He didn’t almost take off since he followed procedures to catch such mistakes before they happen. His line-up check worked, he told the controller and the controller cancelled.
See, when I’m flyin’, I know that the controller owns a part of that sky I’m burnin’ up, and , when I’m careless and lose some altitude, he gets itchy and he wonders where it went. I can’t admit that I’m stupid cuz, then, the whole world will know.
So, I’m pokin’ along, whistlin’ a happy tune, and I misplace 200 feet. I know the “snitch” is triggered and wakes up the controller who rings me up and aks, “Hey, you! What’s goin’ on up there?” and I answer, “Huh?! I, uhhhh, I-I dropped my pencil.” By then, I found the missing 200 feet and everybody is happy and everybody is mad at the so-called “pencil.” Everybody then thinks I’m a genius. The “snitch” is happy cuz, all of a sudden, 200 feet magically appears in the positive column, and the controller is happy cuz the “snitch” ain’t botherin’ him and I’m happy cuz the controller ain’t buzzin’ in my ear. It’s a wonderful world!
In other words, it’s all part of the problem-solving flow chart: If you can blame somebody else…
Weight, plus all the things you’ve mentioned blitzer and more, were contributers to this tragic accident. The plane appears to have at least cleared the ground in some fashion for a little distance before crashing. If under some other circumstance let’s say a pilot were to be forced to use that runway with that airplane, you can bet your last dollar he’d at least ask for a minimal amount of weight for his attempt, it’s just basic and fundamental. As Boeing mentioned, of course the weight of the aircraft has a direct affect on such as this. So do all the other unfortunate aspects of it. When they all add together and pile up you have a heartbreaker.